WHAT CAN EUROPE TELL US ABOUT
FUTURE OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM?
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It is humbling for an American scholar of federalism to admit that the most
interesting developments in federalism are happening in Europe, not the
United States. But this has been true for some time. Kicking off the European
Union’s convention to draft a constitutional treaty in 2001, former French
president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing compared the proceedings to “the famous
convention of Philadelphia of 1787.”1 The comparison was apt, in that the
fundamental relationship between Brussels and the EU’s Member States has
been under renegotiation for much of the past decade and a half. Since the
unsuccessful constitutional convention,2 the EU has seen the world’s most
significant contemporary crisis of fiscal federalism,3 foundational
disagreements between the European Court of Justice and the constitutional
courts of the Member States over judicial supremacy,4 and the prospect of a
real-live secession by a major Member State.5
American federalism has often served as an instructive example for those
developments—sometimes as a role model, perhaps more often as a
cautionary tale.6 The general federalism literature on this side of the Atlantic,
however, has paid relatively little attention to Europe. This inattention is both
intellectually unsatisfying and, increasingly, practically dangerous. As the
* Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School.
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Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Letters to the Editor, The European Convention, INT’L
HERALD
TRIB.,
Dec.
27,
2001,
at
7,
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See, e.g., JEAN PISANI-FERRY, THE EURO CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH 35 (2014).
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Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612 (2002) [hereinafter
Young, Member State Autonomy].
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European Union has slid into a series of crises over the euro, terrorism and
refugees, and now Brexit, it has become increasingly urgent to understand
what is going on over there and what it portends for our own federal system.
In some instances, these crises may offer previews of coming attractions for
America; we have, after all, our own debates over sovereign debt,
immigration, and populist politics. In other respects, European structures and
solutions may offer some options that Americans have previously failed to
consider or appreciate.
It is, alas, easier to see that Europe can teach us something important than
to decipher what the actual lessons are. Comparative law has long encouraged
a healthy skepticism about deriving “answers” to one country’s problems
from another’s experience,7 and the crises rocking Europe are so complex
that it will be decades before they are understood with any confidence. But
all this counsels humility, not inattention. It is time to start talking about what
the arc of European federalism can tell us about federalism in our own
system.
At the outset, one must acknowledge considerable debate as to whether
the European Union is properly described as a federal system at all.8 In other
work, I have focused on competing visions of the EU as “federal” and
“intergovernmental” in nature.9 It seems best to begin here with capacious
standard definitions. Political scientist Jenna Bednar, for example, classifies
a government as federal if it meets structural criteria of “geopolitical
division” (mutually exclusive territories are constitutionally recognized and
may not be abolished by the central authority); “independence” (state and
national governments have electorally or otherwise independent bases of
authority); and “direct governance” (each level of government governs its
citizens directly and is constitutionally sovereign in at least one policy
realm).10 The EU is plainly a federal system under these sorts of criteria, even
7.
See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative
Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223 (2001) (encouraging cautious attention to other
federal systems while noting difficulties in comparison).
8.
See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Europe Without Illusions, in EUROPE WITHOUT
ILLUSIONS: THE PAUL-HENRI SPAAK LECTURES, 1994–1999, at 3, 8 (Andrew Moravcsik ed.,
2005).
9.
See Ernest A. Young, The European Union: A Comparative Perspective [hereinafter
Young, Comparative Perspective], in 1 OXFORD PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW (Robert Schutze & Takis
Tridimas eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3) (on file with Duke Law School Library),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6271&context=faculty_scholarship.
10. JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 18–19 (2009).
Professor Bednar’s definition is similar to William Riker’s. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM:
ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 11 (1964) (stating that a system is federal if (1) it involves
“[t]wo levels of government rul[ing] over the same land and people,” (2) “each level has at least
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if it may also be usefully analyzed as an international organization or some
other sort of entity.11 The point is simply to suggest that comparisons to other
federal systems may be useful—not to exclude other models.
I want to focus on two sets of questions about European federalism, each
of which has significant implications for America. The first involves the
factors that limit centralization in Europe. Most observers seem to consider
the EU to be a less centralized polity than the United States,12 yet the scope
of the EU’s regulatory jurisdiction is equal to or greater than that of the
American national government. Member State autonomy vis-à-vis Brussels
owes much more the disparity in governmental capacity and resources
between the Member States and the Union, as well as to the primary
identification of Europeans with their Member States, than it does to any
constitutive limitation on the Union’s powers. This suggests that the
American literature’s focus on regulatory jurisdiction—the old problem of
limited and enumerated powers—may be misplaced. American scholars need
to pay a lot more attention to the structure and capacity of the institutions that
enforce national law, as well as to the interaction of Americans’ dual
identities as citizens of state and nation.
The second set of questions arises from Europe’s recent travails. Over the
past several years, the European Union has faced a wave of successive crises
over the euro, terrorism, migration and refugees, and the rise of euroskepticism illustrated by the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote. Americans have
viewed these developments with concern, but have not generally asked what
they portend for American federalism. The euro crisis, however, illustrates
the central importance of fiscal federalism—the relationship between the
one area of action in which it is autonomous,” and (3) “[t]here is some guarantee . . . of the
autonomy of each government in its own sphere”); see also DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING
FEDERALISM 12 (1987) (“The simplest possible definition is self-rule plus shared rule. Federalism
thus defined involves some kind of contractual linkage of a presumably permanent character that
(1) provides for power sharing, (2) cuts around the issue of sovereignty, and (3) supplements but
does not seek to replace or diminish prior organic ties where they exist.”); 5 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 795 (J. A. Simpson ed., 2d ed. 1989) (defining “federal” as “that form of government
in which two or more states constitute a political unity while remaining more or less independent
with regard to their internal affairs”).
11. See, e.g., DAVID MCKAY, DESIGNING EUROPE: COMPARATIVE LESSONS FROM THE
FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 8–9 (2001) (arguing that the EU meets standard federal criteria); see also
Andrew Moravcsik, The European Constitutional Settlement, in MAKING HISTORY: EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AT FIFTY 23, 47 (Sophie Meunier & Kathleen R.
McNamara eds., 2007) [hereinafter Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement] (viewing the EU as an
international organization); see also Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the
Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 628 (1999) (viewing the EU as a giant administrative agency).
12. See, e.g., Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 24.
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taxing, spending, and borrowing authority of the center and the periphery.
The American states (and Puerto Rico) face debt crises of their own, and these
crises are already requiring the national government to reconsider the means
by which it supports troubled states and territories.13 Likewise, intraEuropean disagreements about how to regulate immigration and its
differential impact on the Member States have echoes in American disputes
over immigration policy between Washington, D.C. and the border states.14
Finally, the Brexit vote and the parallel rise of Euroskeptic movements in
France and other Member States reflects profound popular concerns about
the legitimacy of governance at the center.15 Although the United States has
not generally been thought to suffer from the same sort of “democratic
deficit” that haunts European discourse, we are experiencing profound
frustration with gridlocked and nonresponsive government in Washington,
reflected in the precipitous decline in public trust in national governing
institutions.16 We are unlikely to see a “Texit” (or perhaps more likely, a
“Utexit” or “West Virgexit”) but it is nonetheless time to ask how the eroding
legitimacy of national government may affect American federalism.

13. See, e.g., Matt Egan, How Illinois became America’s Most Messed-up State, CNN (July
1, 2017, 8:50 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/29/investing/illinois-budget-crisisdowngrade/index.html?iid=EL (describing Illinois’s fiscal crisis); Marry Williams Walsh, Puerto
Rico: A Debt Problem that Kept Boiling Over, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-debt.html?mcubz=0
(discussing Puerto Rico’s debt default). See generally WHEN STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS,
CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS (Peter Conti-Brown &
David Skeel eds., 2012) (discussing the fiscal crises in various states).
14. See, e.g., Tal Kopan, House Passes ‘Kate’s Law’ and Bill Declaring War on Sanctuary
Cities, CNN (June 29, 2017, 6:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/politics/kates-lawsanctuary-cities-house-bill-immigration/index.html; Texas Leads Coalition of States in Lawsuit
Against
Obama
Immigration
Actions,
FOX
NEWS
(Dec.
3,
2014),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/12/03/texas-leads-lawsuit-by-17-states-against-obamaimmigration-actions.html.
15. See, e.g., Bruce Stokes, Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit: Significant Opposition in Key
European Countries to an Ever Closer EU, PEW RES. CTR. (June 7, 2016),
http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/.
16. See, e.g., Clare Malone, Americans Don’t Trust Their Institutions Anymore,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 16, 2016, 12:54 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americansdont-trust-their-institutions-anymore/. A growing literature explores the significance of political
trust, but it generally does not focus on the dynamics of trust in federal systems. See, e.g., MARC
J. HETHERINGTON, WHY TRUST MATTERS: DECLINING POLITICAL TRUST AND THE DEMISE OF
AMERICAN LIBERALISM (2006).
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JURISDICTION, CAPACITY, AND IDENTITY

American federalism debates have tended to focus on the scope of national
regulatory jurisdiction. That was the issue in landmark Supreme Court
decisions like United States v. Lopez17 and Gonzales v. Raich.18 It was also
the question on which most people focused in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius,19 although I shall suggest it was not the
most important part of that decision. American discussions of federalism
have tended to equate what the national government can do with what it will
do, and they have analyzed “can” in terms of constitutional jurisdiction rather
than pragmatic capacity. They have assumed, moreover, that the states will
retain only those functions that are constitutionally reserved to them under
the Tenth Amendment. Certainly one can find important exceptions to these
tendencies in the literature,20 but the general focus has remained on the scope
of the national government’s constitutionally-enumerated powers and the
corresponding enclaves that are reserved to the states.
It is not hard to see why this focus arose or why it persists. Constitutional
lawyers tend to gravitate toward the limits on governmental powers—
particularly those limits that courts may enforce. They tend to leave what
government may choose to do within those limits to political scientists and
public policy types. But constitutional law operates within this policy space
as well, by framing many of the procedures by which decisions are made,21
structuring the political accountability of those who make them,22 and
affecting the resources available to carry them out.23 Neglecting these
dynamics distorts our view of the role that constitutional law plays in our
federal system.
Looking to Europe helps clarify the centrality of these non-jurisdictional
constitutional factors. Europe’s version of the enumerated powers doctrine is
the principle of “conferral,” which holds that the EU may exercise only those
powers conferred on it by its foundational treaties. Hence, Article 5 of the
treaty establishing the European Community provided that “[t]he Community
17. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
18. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
19. 569 U.S. 519 (2012).
20. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 489 (1954); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954); see also Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE
L.J. 1889 (2014).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
22. See id. art. I, §§ 2, 3; id. art. II, § 1.
23. See id. amend. XVI.
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shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and
of the objectives assigned to it therein.”24 Robert Schütze has described this
provision as “the European equivalent of the Tenth Amendment to the
American Constitution.”25
Although originally conceived in narrow terms,26 these conferred powers
have become quite broad over time. This has occurred not only through the
addition of new EU competences in successive treaties, but also through the
expansive interpretation of the EU’s power over the internal market in Article
100a and its implied powers in Article 235.27 These provisions have
functioned effectively as a Commerce Clause and a Necessary and Proper
Clause, respectively, with results that should surprise no one familiar with
Wickard v. Filburn28 and McCulloch v. Maryland.29 Just as Congress’s power
over interstate commerce came to be used for a variety of non-economic
objectives, “[t]he Commission and the European Council . . . conceptualized
the single market in a broader, more holistic, manner. Consumer welfare,
social policy, and environmental policy were regarded as important facets of
the internal market strategy.”30 More generally, a British Member of the
European Parliament recently concluded that “[t]he EU now has exclusive
competence in some, and a degree of competence in almost all, policy
areas.”31

24. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 5, Dec.
24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 41.
25. ROBERT SCHÜTZE, FROM DUAL TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: THE CHANGING
STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN LAW 130 (2009).
26. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2433–34 (1991)
(“[T]he ‘original’ understanding [of the various European agreements] was that the principle of
enumeration would be strict and that jurisdictional enlargement . . . could not be lightly
undertaken.”); see also id. at 2434 (“This understanding was shared not only by scholars, but also
by the Member States and the political organs of the Community . . . .”).
27. See, e.g., Paul Craig, Competence and Member State Autonomy: Causality,
Consequence and Legitimacy, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE AUTONOMY OF THE
MEMBER STATES 11, 11 (Hans Wolfgang-Micklitz & Bruno De Witte eds., 2012); Mark A.
Pollack, Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community, 14 J. PUB.
POL’Y 95, 125 (1994).
28. 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (upholding Congress’s power to regulate small-scale
activities with indirect connections to the interstate economy).
29. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406–07 (1819) (upholding Congress’s power to use
unenumerated means to further its enumerated objectives in Article I).
30. Craig, supra note 27, at 20.
31. Geoffrey Van Orden, Britain’s Departure from “Ever Closer Union” is of Great
Significance, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI.: BREXIT (Apr. 28, 2016),
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/04/28/britians-departure-from-ever-closer-union-is-of-greatsignificance/.
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Much like the United States, then, the European Union has moved from a
regime of “dual federalism,” predicated on sharp jurisdictional divisions
between the central government and its subunits, to “cooperative federalism,”
in which both levels of government share responsibility over most regulatory
subjects.32 One would be hard pressed to come up with anything that the EU
can’t regulate under the powers that the Treaties give to Brussels, as well as
the broad implied powers jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. A
somewhat notorious 2001 EU directive, for example, regulates the use of
ladders in the workplace.33 Nonetheless, the EU is generally perceived to be
far more decentralized than the U.S. Andrew Moravcsik has written, for
example, that “[t]he EU remains, despite a few federal elements, essentially
a confederation of nation-states: the most ambitious and successful among
international organizations, rather than a federation aiming to replicate and
supplant European nation-states.”34
For American scholars this presents a puzzle. If Brussels and Washington
enjoy largely equivalent regulatory jurisdiction, why does the EU remain so
much less centralized than the United States? I think the answer actually has
at least three distinct aspects.
The first has to do with legal culture. Although the EU institutions,
including the European Court of Justice as well as the Commission, have
interpreted the Union’s conferred powers expansively, one still comes away
with the sense that they have not been read as aggressively as they might have
been on this side of the Atlantic. An American lawyer looks at, say, the treaty
provisions allowing the EU to regulate in order to create and preserve an
internal market among the Member States, and says “Bingo, it’s a Commerce
Clause!” And we know that commerce can be anything, because everything

32. See SCHÜTZE, supra note 25, at 346. On these different models of federalism, see,
Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950); Ernest A. Young,
The Puzzling Persistence of Dual Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY: NOMOS LV, at
34 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014).
33. Directive 2001/45/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001
Amending Council Directive 89/655/EEC Concerning the Minimum Safety and Health
Requirements for the Use of Work Equipment by Workers at Work, 2001 O.J. (L 195) 46. The
directive states that it “is a practical contribution towards creating the social dimension of the
internal market[,]” and it purports to comply with the EU’s subsidiarity principle by asserting that
it “is the most appropriate means of achieving the desired objectives and does not go beyond what
is necessary for that purpose.” Id.; see also Charles Wyplosz, Eur. Comm’n for Econ. & Fin.
Affairs, The Centralization–Decentralization Issue, at 26 & n.18 (Sept. 26, 2015),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/dp014_en_2.pdf (suggesting that such
directives are “needless entrenchments on national sovereignty”).
34. Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 25.
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affects it.35 Hence we end up with a Federal Government prosecuting
robberies of local drug dealers and incarcerating sex offenders, 36 all in the
name of protecting interstate commerce. The American enumerated powers
jurisprudence has deconstructed the phrase “commerce among the several
states” to the point that it largely lacks meaning today.37
My strong impression is that Europeans generally don’t think that way.
They are not cursed by Legal Realism, or at least not to the same degree as
American lawyers, and so when they read a textual provision purporting to
grant a limited regulatory power, their first instinct is not to deconstruct the
purported limits on that power and turn it into a blank check. The fact that
EU powers may be expanded by new treaties—and that such treaties have
proved fairly frequent—may also relieve the pressure for adventurous
interpretation of existing provisions. Because the U.S. Constitution is
functionally unamendable, after all, American lawyers have a strong
incentive to find some basis for desired innovations in the original text. In
any event, I submit that one reason that the EU’s powers are more limited in
practice than Congress’s is that European lawyers aren’t as inclined to kick
over the limits every time they want to legislate more broadly.
But I think two other aspects of the puzzle are considerably more
important. Both illustrate the relative importance of regulatory jurisdiction
vis-à-vis other aspects of the federal balance. To begin, the EU is more
decentralized than the United States because despite the breadth of the EU’s
jurisdiction, its actual institutional capacity is far more limited in several
respects:
1. The EU’s capacity to make decisions independent of the Member
States is far more limited than Congress’s;
2. it has far less money to spend, and far less power to raise more,
than does the American federal government; and
35. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005) (holding that home-grown
medicinal marijuana use affects the interstate market for illicit drugs); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 130–33 (1942) (holding that on-farm wheat consumption sufficiently affects the
interstate market for wheat).
36. See Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2081–82 (2016) (holding that in a
prosecution under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, for robbery of a drug dealer, federal
prosecutors need not show that the relevant drugs moved in or affected interstate commerce);
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 149 (2010) (upholding federal civil commitment of
sexually dangerous persons as necessary and proper to operation of a federal prison system, which
is in turn necessary and proper to enforcement of Congress’s enumerated powers).
37. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231, 1236 (1994) (“Of course, in this day and age, discussing the doctrine of enumerated
powers is like discussing the redemption of Imperial Chinese bonds. There is now virtually no
significant aspect of life that is not in some way regulated by the federal government.”).
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3. it depends on Member States almost completely to implement
European law.
Take decision-making first. One may fairly debate the height of the
institutional hurdles facing EU legislation,38 but the EU legislative process
plainly incorporates a great deal more political constraint on central
lawmaking that adversely affects the Member States than does its American
analog.39 The EU Council—which retains a decisive role in approving EU
legislation—does not simply represent the Member States; it is actually
composed of Member State ministers or (when it meets as the Council of
Europe) heads of state. And although the Council’s traditional unanimity
requirement has largely eroded over time, the “qualified majority” voting
procedure (as well as the EU’s norms favoring consensus decision-making)
still affords considerable scope for minorities of states to block legislation
they oppose.40 In any event, one need only have paid marginal attention to the
development of recent European crises over the euro, terrorism, and
migration to note that the political lead has been taken by leaders of the
Member States, not the Community institutions.41 The EU institutions are not
yet the problem-solvers of first resort when the going gets tough. And
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, not EU Council President Donald Tusk,
remains the essential figure in EU politics.

38. Compare, e.g., Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 34 (“Formally,
[the European lawmaking process] makes everyday legislation in the EU as difficult to enact as a
constitutional amendment in the USA.”), with Young, Comparative Perspective, supra note 9, at
22–23 (noting that the EU legislates at a rate comparable to Congress and that its constitutive
treaties are amended far more often than the U.S. Constitution).
39. See Young, Comparative Perspective, supra note 9, at 23.
40. See id. at 24–25; see also LUUK VAN MIDDELAAR, THE PASSAGE TO EUROPE: HOW A
CONTINENT BECAME A UNION 41 (Liz Waters trans., 2013) (“[T]o this day most decisions—and
certainly the more important—are taken on the basis of consensus between the member states.”).
To put the situation in terms of American legislative procedure, the current state of EU legislation
seems analogous not simply to a pre-Seventeenth Amendment U.S. Senate, in which the Senators
are selected by the state legislatures, but rather one in which those legislatures also have an
absolute right to instruct their Senators on particular votes and in which each Senator has a “blue
slip”—like veto over not only nominees to office, as in this country, but much legislation.
41. See, e.g., Sergio Fabbrini, The European Council, Careful of the Elephant that Prowls
Brussels, ITALY 24 (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.italy24.ilsole24ore.com/art/politics/2017-0310/the-european-council-careful-of-the-elephant-that-prowls-brussels-182601.php?uuid=AEPrc
kl (“To emerge from decision-making stall, leaders of the strongest national governments have
taken unilateral action to manage challenges that threatened their internal consensus.”); Charles
Grant, What is Wrong with the European Commission?, CTR. FOR EUR. REFORM (June 27, 2013),
http://www.cer.eu/insights/what-wrong-european-commission (observing that “ the euro crisis
has drawn the EU into taking increasingly political executive decisions”).
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Perhaps even more important, “the EU does not (with a few exceptions)
enjoy the power to coerce, administer, or tax.”42 Start with the money. The
EU is, as Daniel Ziblatt notes, “fiscally speaking, a political pygmy; its actual
budget is minuscule, and it is arguably the largest political unit in history
without the power to raise debt for itself.”43 EU revenue comes predominantly
from three sources: duties on imports, collected by the Member States and
transferred to the EU; a share of the value-added tax collected by the Member
States; and a levy on the gross national income of each Member State capped
at slightly under 1.3 percent.44 The last of these—which is simply a transfer
from Member State budgets to the central authority—now accounts for about
sixty percent of EU revenue.45 In this, the EU looks much like America under
the Articles of Confederation (although without the incessant failures by the
American states to actually pay their contributions46). None of this yields a
great deal of revenue, and even the duties and VAT components are not
structured in such a way as to allow the EU much flexibility to pursue
regulatory objectives through the tax code.47
Given these modest revenues, the EU accounts for only about two percent
of European public spending; the U.S. national government, on the other
hand, collects roughly seventy percent of American tax revenue and accounts
for over half of total public expenditure in the United States.48 Hence, “the
EU is not anywhere near other federal states” in terms of fiscal muscle. 49
Much of the EU budget, moreover, goes to the common agricultural policy
and transfers to developing regions; “[l]ittle room exists for discretionary
42.
43.

Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 34.
Daniel Ziblatt, Between Centralization and Federalism in the European Union, in THE
GLOBAL DEBT CRISIS: HAUNTING U.S. AND EUROPEAN FEDERALISM 113, 113 (Paul E. Peterson &
Daniel Nadler eds., 2014); see also Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 35
(“Redistributing wealth by taxation and spending is the preeminent activity of the modern state,
yet the EU does little of this.”).
44. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, EUROPEAN UNION PUBLIC FINANCE 237 (4th ed. 2008),
https://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files/EU%20public%20finance%20-%202009.pdf.
45. See id. at 238.
46. On the failure of the states to pay their “requisitions,” see CALVIN H. JOHNSON,
RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION
43–45 (2005).
47. Compare, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 563 (2012) (holding
that Congress could employ its taxing power to encourage individuals to purchase health
insurance), with United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 27 (1953) (noting that the Court had
upheld a wide variety of taxes with regulatory effects).
48. Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 8; Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at
35; see also PISANI-FERRY, supra note 3, at 153 (noting that Europe “is not equipped with a
meaningful federal budget”).
49. Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 8.
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spending by Brussels technocrats.”50 This minuscule budget has led some
commentators to conclude that “the EU does not have the main attributes of
a federal state.”51
The lack of broad fiscal powers sharply constrains the sorts of policies that
the EU can enact and, therefore, the functions that Brussels can “take over”
from the Member States. As Giandomenico Majone has suggested, lack of
fiscal authority effectively limits the EU to regulatory policies, as opposed to
non-regulatory or benefits-based programs.52 The EU also lacks the means to
play the counter-cyclical role of ratcheting up welfare spending in times of
recession that central governments typically play in federal states.53 And these
fiscal constraints deprive the EU institutions of a tool frequently used by
Congress to regulate outside the scope of its enumerated authority, which is
the ability to make large financial grants to state governments conditioned on
the implementation of federal policies that Congress could not enact
directly.54 Perhaps most important, the EU’s budgetary constraints leave few
opportunities to win the loyalty of European citizens by providing essential
benefits analogous to American programs like Social Security or Medicare. 55
These disparities in resources are, unsurprisingly, mirrored in
administrative capacity. As Professor Moravcsik points out, “the notion of a
European ‘superstate’ swarming with Brussels bureaucrats is a delusion (or a
deception) of Euroskeptics.”56 The European Commission, the principal
administrative arm of the EU, employed 32,666 people in 2013—which made
it about half the size of the U.S. Social Security Administration and a slightly
smaller employer than the City of Chicago.57 This lack of administrative
50. Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 35; see also Wyplosz, supra
note 33, at 8 (noting that “[l]ess than half of the Commission’s budget is used for collective
spending, mostly the administrative costs of the EU institutions . . . . [T]he remaining is used for
transfers, not for direct spending.”).
51. Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 8.
52. See Giandomenico Majone, The European Commission as Regulator, in REGULATING
EUROPE 61, 61 (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1996); see also PISANI-FERRY, supra note 3, at 157
(identifying difficulties in creating a larger budget for the euro zone or the EU as a whole).
53. Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 10.
54. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (upholding Congress’s
requirement that states raise their minimum drinking age to twenty-one as a condition on receipt
of a portion of federal highway funds).
55. Even in the area of farm policy, where most of the EU’s money goes, national payments
still outstrip benefits to farmers from the EU. See Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra
note 11, at 36.
56. Id.
57. Compare EUR. COMM’N, HR KEY FIGURES CARD: STAFF MEMBERS (2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/hr_key_figures_en.pdf, with RAHM EMMANUEL, CITY OF
CHICAGO:
2013
BUDGET
OVERVIEW
23
(2013),

1120

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

capacity radically constrains the EU’s ability to enforce its own laws and
administer its own programs. Outside certain key institutions like the
European Central Bank or the Commission’s Competition Directorate, the
overwhelming responsibility for enforcing EU law falls to the Member
States.58
A final centrifugal force in the EU is the strong tendency of Europeans to
identify primarily with their national political communities.59 Europe has the
opposite problem: Citizens strongly identify with their Member States—as
Frenchmen, Germans, or Poles—but it is not clear they think of themselves
as “Europeans.”60 Both the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties bow to this reality
by stating explicitly that “[t]he Union shall respect the national identities of
its Member States.”61
The primary identification of European citizens with their Member
States—as well as the far more democratic quality of governance at the
Member State level than in Brussels—has meant that the Member States
remain the primary font of governmental legitimacy within the EU. In the
United States, by contrast, the national government has long drawn upon a
well of legitimacy at least as deep as those of the States (although public
opinion data showing radical declines in public trust for national institutions
may be altering this picture62). Europeans’ primary identification with their
Member States enhances political checks on the EU’s use of its conferred
powers and likely goes a long way toward explaining why Brussels has not
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/obm/supp_info/2013%20Budget/2013Ove
rview.pdf (proposing 33,550 employees in 2013); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT
TO
THE
SOCIAL
SECURITY
BULLETIN
2.73
(2016),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2016/supplement16.pdf (listing 65,873
employees).
58. See Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 11, at 36. Professor Moravcsik
also notes the EU’s general lack of coercive capacity: “It has no army, police and intelligence
capacity, and a miniscule tax base, discretion on spending, and administration.” Id. at 35.
59. See, e.g., VAN MIDDELAAR, supra note 40, at 212–25 (noting the problem and discussing
different historical strategies for overcoming it); Hartmut Kaelble, Identification with Europe and
Politicization of the EU Since the 1980s, in EUROPEAN IDENTITY 193, 205–08 (Jeffrey T. Checkel
& Peter J. Katzenstein eds., 2009) (collecting evidence).
60. See, e.g., Anthony D. Smith, National Identity and the Idea of European Unity, 68 INT’L
AFF. 55, 58 (1992).
61. Treaty on European Union tit. I, art. F, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 326); see also Treaty
of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
Community art. 4(2), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306); Leonard F. M. Besselink, National and
Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon, 6 UTRECHT L. REV. 36, 40–44 (2010) (discussing
these Lisbon treaty provisions).
62. See State Governments Viewed Favorably as Federal Rating Hits New Low, PEW RES.
CTR. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/15/state-govermnents-viewedfavorably-as-federal-rating-hits-new-low/.
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been granted greater fiscal and bureaucratic resources.63 And as the Brexit
vote and the rise of Euroskeptic populism on the Continent demonstrate,
nationalist ties to the Member States can blossom into a significant threat to
integration.64
So what can Americans learn from all this? Most fundamentally, we
should stop obsessing about the scope of regulatory jurisdiction. The point is
not that jurisdiction is unimportant; surely a real constraint on the scope of
congressional regulation would be a powerful limit on national power. But
we have arguably never had such a constraint. In the early Republic, the
Supreme Court never struck down a federal statute on the ground that it
exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers. And while the political branches
may have internalized some sort of jurisdictional constraint, 65 they have
tended to get over it when the national interest seemed to truly compel federal
action. Likewise, even the Lochner-era Court was a highly inconsistent
enforcer of jurisdictional limits on national power.66 And the Rehnquist
Court’s “Federalist Revival,” which struck down national legislation on
enumerated powers grounds in a few cases,67 did more to fuel the careers of
young academics than to meaningfully limit Congress’s powers. 68 What
Europe teaches, however, is that meaningful federalism can flourish even in
a regime where central regulatory jurisdiction is exceptionally broad. We
should focus more on how this can be so.
More particularly, we should think hard about representation,
governmental capacity, and identity in our own system. The political
safeguards of Member State autonomy work in Europe because the Member
States’ representation is so direct.69 The EU Council represents the Member
63. See, e.g., Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 8, 12.
64. See CLARKE, GOODWIN & WHITELEY, supra note 5, at 173 (citing English national
identity as a contributing factor in the Brexit vote). It is unclear that this factor was as important
as more specific concerns about immigration, however. See id. at 161. Moreover, national
identities can cut in different directions; those identifying as Scottish tended to vote against
Brexit. See id.
65. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 20, at 545.
66. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998) (demonstrating that the Lochner-era Court upheld many
federal statutes against constitutional challenges on enumerated powers grounds).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking down the federal
Violence Against Women Act as exceeding Congress’s commerce power); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as
exceeding Congress’s enforcement authority under the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (striking down the federal Gun Free School Zones Act as
exceeding Congress’s commerce power).
68. Which is not to say that the (then) young academics are not eternally grateful.
69. See, e.g., Young, Member State Autonomy, supra note 6, at 1689.
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States’ governing institutions, not simply people and interests in the Member
States. The political safeguards of federalism in our own system are far more
attenuated.70 At best, national politicians elected by particular states are only
imperfectly responsive to the interests of state governments;71 at worst, they
may view state politicians as rivals for political and financial support. 72
Perhaps the mistake of “political safeguards” scholarship in this country has
been its focus on federal representatives—who are, after all, national
officials—rather than on the important role that state officials play in
implementing and enforcing federal law.
American scholars are starting to wake up to what my friend Heather
Gerken calls “the power of the servant”73—that is, the ability of state officials
who implement federal law to shape the content and impact of that law,
sometimes in ways that are quite different from what federal authorities
intend. The EU experience puts an exclamation point on this line of research,
because there the central authority is almost completely dependent on
potentially “uncooperative federalists” to implement European law. It
suggests that we ought to spend less time worrying about the scope of the
Commerce Clause and more about how federal programs structure the role of
state implementation. That would suggest, for example, that the most
important federalism case in recent memory is not Lopez but Sebelius’s
70. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of
Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 213, 237 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds.,
2001) (noting that, in contrast to the EU, “neither the governments nor the legislatures of the
several States in their corporate capacities are represented in the federal decision-making
bodies”); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 223–24 (2000) (pointing out that in America, Members of Congress
have no particular incentive to protect the prerogatives of state governments). Professor Kramer
thought that political parties created an alternative set of safeguards, but that notion has come
under serious criticism. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 960–61 (2001); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John
C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459,
1471–89 (2000).
71. See Young, Member State Autonomy, supra note 6, at 1649. This has been true not only
since the Seventeenth Amendment divested state legislatures of the power to select U.S. senators,
but rather since the Founders declined to give states power to instruct or recall their national
senators and representatives. See William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 452, 456 (1955).
72. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 112 (2001).
73. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4,
33–37 (2010); see also JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT
THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 168–212 (2009); Jessica Bulman-Pozen &
Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009).
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holding on the Medicaid expansion, which crucially gave state governments
a choice about whether to implement federal programs.74
European Member States have a credible power of the servant because,
given the general lack of capacity in Brussels, they are in most cases the only
game in town.75 (A recent study by Daniel Kelemen, however, suggests that
Europeans are increasingly turning to courts, via American-style private
rights of action, to enforce EU law when national executive actors drag their
feet.76) American states have correspondingly less scope to be uncooperative
federalists, however, because at least in principle the federal government can
step in and enforce federal law directly whenever it likes.77 Limited resources
and bureaucratic capacity constrain this option, but as noted Washington,
D.C., is considerably better endowed in these respects than Brussels. And the
national government’s vast financial resources—derived from its (legally)
unconstrained ability to tax and borrow—allows Washington to offer the
States deals they cannot refuse in a way that is largely unavailable to
Brussels.78
This comparison suggests that the American literature on uncooperative
federalism ought to focus in more detail upon the constraints that prevent the
national government from superseding state implementation of federal law.
Those constraints are likely to vary significantly across different statutory
regimes. And to the extent that the constraints are statutory, their efficacy
may turn in significant part on the willingness of courts to enforce those
constraints in the face of executive circumvention. Likewise, the states’
power of the servant may be avoided where private plaintiffs have federal
rights of action to compel particular action under federal law. 79 Although
74. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578–79 (2012); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also Ernest A. Young, A Research Agenda for Uncooperative
Federalists, 48 TULSA L. REV. 427, 440–43 (2013) (discussing Sebelius and the importance of
states’ option to refuse to participate in federal programs).
75. See Halberstam, supra note 70, at 238–39.
76. R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND
REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011).
77. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD.
L. REV. 1183, 1201 (1995). The earliest example of national authorities stepping in to supersede
state implementation that proved overly “uncooperative” involved the Fugitive Slave Act in the
antebellum period. H. Robert Baker, The Fugitive Slave Clause and the Antebellum Constitution,
30 LAW & HIST. REV. 1133, 1138–39 (2012).
78. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (recognizing Congress’s broad
power to impose conditions on federal grants of funding to states).
79. In this regard, the Supreme Court’s recent cases curtailing private rights of action to
enforce rights conferred under federal cooperative federalism regimes may play an important role
in maintaining the autonomy of state officials’ enforcement discretion. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ.
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many of us concerned about preserving state autonomy have long viewed
uncooperative federalism as an attractive substitute for Herbert Wechsler’s
idealized “political safeguards of federalism,” it has always been difficult to
pin down the extent to which this state-protective dynamic actually works in
this country.80 The European experience suggests that the allocation of
resources and implementation capacity is an appropriate starting point for that
inquiry.
Finally, American federalism scholars need to think considerably more
deeply about identity. The fact that citizens of the EU still identify chiefly as
Frenchmen, Spaniards, or Poles—not Europeans—continues to have
enormous political consequences for the structure of European federalism. In
the United States, we take virtually for granted that Americans identify quite
strongly with the nation, and many have doubted whether they identify with
their States as well.81 On this conventional view, we have only Americans—
not Vermonters, Californians, or North Carolinians.82 This “one nation”
orthodoxy looks less plausible, however, in light of mounting evidence of
polarization and fragmentation across the American political landscape.
Other observers have acknowledged a division of loyalties within the
American political community, but questioned whether it breaks down along
state lines.83
The basic question whether Americans identify with their states breaks
down into a host of more specific issues, all of which deserve further
investigation. Do the states represent distinct political communities that

v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (refusing to let private plaintiffs enforce rights under the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
80. For a first-rate attempt at an answer, see NUGENT, supra note 73, at 213–29.
81. Compare, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL
IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 25 (2008) (assuming, without evidence, that they do not),
with Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, and Political
Culture in the American Federal System 123 (Feb. 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with
the
Duke
Law
Scholarship
Repository),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3431/ (arguing that often Americans do
identify with their states as well as with the nation).
82. We definitely still have Texans. See, e.g., WAYNE THORBURN, RED STATE: AN INSIDER’S
STORY OF HOW THE GOP CAME TO DOMINATE TEXAS POLITICS 2 (2014) (observing that many
people “think of themselves first and foremost as Texans”).
83. See, e.g., BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED
AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 5–6 (2008) (arguing that identity breaks down neighborhood by
neighborhood); COLIN WOODARD, AMERICAN NATIONS: A HISTORY OF THE ELEVEN RIVAL
REGIONAL CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA 2–3 (2011) (arguing for strong regional identities based
on historical migration patterns).
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meaningfully affect political beliefs?84 To what extent do personal
attachments to states affect political behavior? And do attachments to states
trade off with, or complement, loyalty to the nation? Few American legal
scholars have taken these questions seriously, but they go to the basic
sociological underpinnings of federalism. The European literature has long
had a much better handle on these questions,85 and it is time Americans paid
more attention to them.
II.

CRISES OF FINANCE, MIGRATION, AND DISTRUST

This is a difficult historical moment to be writing about the European
Union. It has always been difficult for outsiders to keep up; notwithstanding
the requirement of unanimity to amend the Union’s foundational treaties, the
Member States have proven remarkably willing to undertake major structural
revisions at relatively frequent intervals. If a scholar thought that he
understood the basic workings of the EU institutions in, say, 2002,86 he would
on returning to the subject today find the landscape significantly reshaped by
the Lisbon Treaty as well as the various agreements that have dealt with the
euro crisis—not to mention the still-unresolved conflicts opened by the Brexit
vote.
Recent years, however, have been particularly tumultuous. The euro crisis
exposed a basic contradiction between the fiscal and monetary arrangements
of the EU’s fiscal federalism. Intertwined crises of migration and terrorism
highlighted the Union’s difficulty in formulating responses to common
problems. And rejection of the proposed constitutional treaty by French and
Dutch voters in 2005, dramatically underscored by Britain’s Brexit vote and
rise of Euroskeptic populism in many other Member States, signaled that the
masses may not share elites’ enthusiasm for “ever closer union.”87

84. See, e.g., ROBERT S. ERIKSON, GERALD C. WRIGHT & JOHN P. MCIVER, STATEHOUSE
DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES 71 (1993) (finding, based
on extensive public opinion data, that one’s state is a significant predictor of ideological and
partisan identification).
85. See, e.g., NEIL FLIGSTEIN, EUROCLASH: THE EU, EUROPEAN IDENTITY, AND THE FUTURE
OF EUROPE 4–6 (2008); THOMAS RISSE, A COMMUNITY OF EUROPEANS? TRANSNATIONAL
IDENTITIES AND PUBLIC SPHERES 4–8 (2010).
86. See, e.g., Young, Member State Autonomy, supra note 6, at 1735–37.
87. The election of Emmanuel Macron in France—more importantly, the defeat of populist
Marine le Pen—has suggested to many that the populist wave has crested in Europe. That may
well be so. But again and again the EU has proven the truth of Yogi Berra’s famous
pronouncement that “it’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”
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Each of these crises is, in critical respects, unique to Europe. But each also
resonates with particular tensions that exist in American federalism as well.
I want to suggest that each highlights a way in which conventional wisdom
about American federalism may need to be re-thought.
A. Fiscal Federalism and the Euro
I suspect that most American constitutional lawyers are the sort of people
who were attracted to law school on the understanding that there would be no
math. As a result, much of the federalism literature in this country skirts the
topic of fiscal federalism. But one lesson of comparative federalism studies
generally—whether of Europe or Canada or Australia or Switzerland—is that
it’s crucial to follow the money.88 Most fundamentally, the way a polity
allocates taxing and spending authority may provide clues to more
fundamental democratic dynamics. As Charles Wyplosz has pointed out,
“[d]emocracy was born when elected bodies were given the final say on
taxation and public spending. European citizens still consider fiscal policy as
a key attribute of the State.”89 Hence, the fact that “fiscal policy [remains]
wedded to national sovereignty” indicates that Europeans “consider that the
State is fundamentally national.”90 Likewise, until Europeans “recognize the
European Parliament as representing their interests, there is little scope for
EU taxation.”91
The EU’s euro crisis vividly illustrates a more complex set of fiscal
federalism dynamics involving monetary policy, fiscal policy, and debt. It
suggests that Americans should pay more attention to our own fiscal
federalism arrangements before we find ourselves in a similar predicament.
Europe’s crisis arose out of a basic asymmetry between the EU’s retention of
fiscal authority at the Member State level (Member States decide how much
they want to tax, spend, and borrow) and the centralization of monetary
policy among the states that adopted the euro. States like Greece were able to
borrow extensively because their credit was tied to more fiscally sound euro
countries, then when the financial crisis hit and the debt came due, they were
unable to adjust by pursuing traditional monetary policy remedies (like
devaluation). Because the loans to Greece and other troubled economies were
88. See, e.g., MCKAY, supra note 11, at 136 (concluding that “distributional issues are often
at the heart of conflicts between central and state governments; and of these none is as important
as intergovernmental fiscal relations”).
89. Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 8.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 12.
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held by banks throughout Europe, a Greek default would have had serious
systemic effects. In the end, the more healthy euro zone economies (along
with the European central bank and the IMF) agreed basically to bail the
Greeks out.92
The literature on fiscal federalism suggests that there are basically two
ways to organize the financial relationship between a central government and
its subunits.93 In most federal systems, the center guarantees the debts of the
subunits.94 These guarantees create a potential for moral hazard; subunits may
spend and borrow willy nilly (and creditors will be willing to lend to them),
knowing that the central government will make good their debts.95 In order to
avoid that problem, most central governments retain control over fiscal policy
by constraining the taxing, spending, and borrowing authority of subnational
governments.96 The alternative viable arrangement is for the subunits to retain
fiscal sovereignty over taxing, spending, and borrowing, while the central
government ensures that the credit markets will discipline them by
committing not to bail the subunits out in the event of a default. 97 The trick,
of course, is in making the no-bailout commitment credible. Where that effort
succeeds, the costs of borrowing for each subunit—reflected in the interest
rates it must pay on the bonds it issues—will vary according to the
creditworthiness of each subnational government.98
The United States has generally pursued the latter arrangement. Federal
law imposes no general constraints on state taxing, spending, or borrowing.
The national government has, however, generally refused to bail out state
governments when all that autonomy gets them into trouble. Because the
United States has no formal prohibition of bailouts, the credibility of the
92. See, e.g., PISANI-FERRY, supra note 3, at 80; JOHAN VAN OVERTVELDT, THE END OF THE
EURO: THE UNEASY FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 141–44 (2011).
93. See, e.g., JONATHAN A. RODDEN, HAMILTON’S PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF
FISCAL FEDERALISM 10–12 (2006); Michael S. Greve, Our Federalism is Not Europe’s. It’s
Becoming Argentina’s., 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 19 (2012).
94. See Paul E. Peterson & Daniel Nadler, Freedom to Fail: The Keystone of American
Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 251, 253 (2012) (“Except in Canada and Switzerland [and the
U.S.], state debts in all federal systems in the industrialized countries of the world are implicitly
or explicitly guaranteed by the federal government.”).
95. See, e.g., Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 16.
96. See Greve, supra note 93, at 19; Peterson & Nadler, supra note 94, at 252–53; Jonathan
Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism [hereinafter Rodden, Market Discipline], in
WHEN STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES
IN FISCAL CRISIS 123, 128 (Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012).
97. See Rodden, Market Discipline, supra note 96, at 128; Peterson & Nadler, supra note
94, at 253–54.
98. See Rodden, Market Discipline, supra note 96, at 137 (collecting data on credit-default
swaps on state debt obligations).
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American “no bailout” commitment rests instead on historical practice.99
Eight states defaulted in the 1840s, ten more in the late nineteenth century
following Reconstruction, and Arkansas defaulted during the Depression. 100
Although there have been efforts to get the national government to intervene
in each instance, those efforts have generally been unsuccessful.101 The
current significant differences among bond yields and credit ratings for the
various American states strongly suggest that financial markets continue to
perceive the national government’s “no bailout” commitment as highly
credible.102
Germany—the leading federal system within the EU—has chosen a mixed
model; the central government controls taxation by the Länder but not
expenditures or borrowing, and bailouts are available but not automatic. 103
Because of the strong bailout expectation, the credit ratings of the various
Länder do not vary according to actual creditworthiness of the particular
Länder governments.104 But the EU itself purports to follow the American
model of fiscal federalism. The Member States do their own taxing, spending,
and borrowing, and Brussels does not formally guarantee their debts. 105
Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon incorporated an explicit “no bailout” clause.106
Nonetheless, financial markets appear to have treated the various Member
States’ debts as if they were part of a fiscally-unitary federation.107 The nobailout commitment, in other words, was not taken seriously.
99. See MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 168–69 (2012).
100. Peterson & Nadler, supra note 94, at 264–65.
101. See RODDEN, supra note 93, at 57–64.
102. See Rodden, Market Discipline, supra note 96, at 137–40; see also Pamela M. Prah &
Stephen C. Fehr, Infographic: S&P State Credit Ratings, 2001–2014, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (June
9, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/06/09/spratings-2014 (showing the variation over time in state credit ratings from Standard & Poor’s).
103. See RODDEN, supra note 93, at 153–66.
104. See, e.g., UNICREDIT, HANDBOOK OF GERMAN STATES 3 (2012),
https://www.research.unicreditgroup.eu/DocsKey/credit_docs_2012_125692.ashx?EXT=pdf&K
EY=n03ZZLYZf5l2PWPsZLYmH9qxdmQRVPZI4GAa4YUoXKk= (stating that “[a]ll 16
[German] states enjoy credit ratings in the highest rating category” and attributing this to “the
federal solidarity principle . . . guaranteeing support to states should they ever be in real financial
difficulties”).
105. Prior to the euro crisis, the Union did impose some fiscal constraints on the euro zone
countries in the form of the “Stability and Growth Pact,” but those constraints quickly lost most
of their credibility when the Union failed to enforce them after French and German violations of
the Pact’s deficit limits. See, e.g., The Death of the Stability Pact, ECONOMIST (Nov. 27, 2003),
http://www.economist.com/node/2246457; see also PISANI-FERRY, supra note 3, at 31.
106. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 125,
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 99.
107. See, e.g., VAN OVERTVELDT, supra note 92, at 85 (noting that prior to the crisis, “[t]he
spread between Greek and German bonds almost disappeared”); Greve, supra note 93, at 21.
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Nothing in these fiscal or monetary arrangements can be said to have
caused the euro crisis. The trouble was that the various euro zone countries
varied considerably in their vulnerability to the worldwide financial crisis that
began in 2007, and the EU lacked the central stabilization mechanisms
available to more centralized states.108 In particular, countries like Greece,
Portugal, and Ireland—which generally had less competitive economies and
more profligate public sectors—had been able to borrow at rates driven by
the euro area’s stronger economies, like Germany. When the crisis came,
these weaker economies suddenly found themselves in danger of defaulting
on their debts. Because of their commitment to monetary union, these states
lacked the ability to respond through monetary policy—a devaluation of the
Greek drachma, for example.109
As financial markets had correctly predicted, the euro arrangement made
the EU’s no-bailout commitment difficult to keep.110 An actual debt default
by a euro zone country would put pressure on that Member State to exit the
euro so as to regain the monetary tools to respond to the crisis. Moreover, the
integration of the euro zone economies meant that much of the Greek debt,
as well as debt issued by other struggling Member States, was held by banks
in Germany and other powerful EU countries.111 Under the circumstances, it
is hardly surprising that the no-bailout pledge went by the boards.112

108. See Ziblatt, supra note 43, at 115.
109. See, e.g., PISANI-FERRY, supra note 3, at 87 (noting that “an important factor was that
[Greece] was borrowing money in a currency that was its own, but over which it had no control”);
Juan F. Navarro-Staicos, Greece Should Follow Argentina into Default and Devaluation,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/
2012/0402/Greece-should-follow-Argentina-into-default-and-devaluation (noting that, in similar
fiscal circumstances, Argentina defaulted on its debt and devalued its currency).
110. See PISANI-FERRY, supra note 3, at 69 (“[I]nvestors believed that in the unlikely event
of an accident, euro-area member states would put together some type of rescue operation . . . .
[T]hey did not see the so-called no-bailout clause as credible enough to fully price the risk of
individual sovereign default.”).
111. See, e.g., Greve, supra note 93, at 21–22.
112. See Alicia Hinarejos, Fiscal Federalism in the European Union: Evolution and Future
Choices for EMU, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1621, 1627 (2013) (suggesting that allowing Greece
and other troubled Member States to default could “have had fatal consequences for the future of
the EU as a political project”). The measures addressing the debt crisis were not technically a
“bailout,” and the ECJ has held that they did not violate the no-bailout clause in the Treaty. See
Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, Case C-370/12 [2012] E.C.R. I-00000 (Ir.). But as a practical matter,
most observers seem to view these measures as bailouts. See Hinarejos, supra note 112, at 1628;
P.W., From Bail-out to Bail-in, ECON.: FREE EXCHANGE (Dec. 14, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/12/european-banks.
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It is too early to tell how the euro crisis will ultimately play out.113 But one
can already see the central question for American federalism. No-bailout
commitments are absolutely central to the traditional theory of fiscal
federalism, which posits that without them the central government would
have to take over the fiscal policy of its subunits. Otherwise, the subunits
have strong incentives to spend or borrow as much as they like, knowing that
the center will come to their rescue if trouble arises.114 Consistent with this
model, we see that the euro zone countries have agreed to a “Fiscal Compact”
that requires those countries to balance their budgets.115 This is not quite the
same as ceding Member State control over spending and borrowing, as those
states still retain the ultimate political authority over these decisions. But the
compact is meant to be legally enforceable, and in any event the direction of
institutional movement is clear: The weakening of the central authority’s nobailout commitment leads to significant pressure to weaken the subunit’s
fiscal autonomy.116
This point is significant because the United States faces its own quiet crisis
of fiscal federalism.117 State and local governments report upwards of
$1 trillion dollars in unfunded pension liabilities.118 The most recent flare-up
has occurred in Puerto Rico, which has announced its inability to pay its debt
and sought relief from the national government.119 The resulting legislation
provided no financial assistance, but it did protect the Commonwealth from
creditor litigation for a limited period of time.120 Even this minimal federal
113. See, e.g., Jennifer Rankin, No Bailout Funds for Greece as Eurozone Finance Chiefs
Fail
to
Agree
Deal,
GUARDIAN
(May
23,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/may/23/no-bailout-funds-for-greece-as-eurozonefinance-chiefs-fail-to-agree-deal.
114. See RODDEN, supra note 93, at 274–75.
115. See Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary
Union
art.
3,
Mar.
2,
2012,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documentspublications/agreements-conventions/agreement/?aid=2012008; Federico Fabbrini, The Fiscal
Compact, The “Golden Rule,” and the Paradox of European Federalism, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2013); Hinarejos, supra note 112, at 1633.
116. See, e.g., Wyplosz, supra note 33, at 18 (emphasizing the conflict between the Fiscal
Compact and national sovereignty).
117. See Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 147–48 (2012).
118. See Steve Malanga, Covering up the Pension Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/covering-up-the-pension-crisis-1472164758; Joshua D. Rauh, The
Public
Pension
Crisis,
HOOVER
INSTITUTION
(Apr.
12,
2016),
http://www.hoover.org/research/public-pension-crisis.
119. See Mary W. Walsh, Puerto Rico Declares a Form of Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (May 3,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-debt.html.
120. See Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA),
Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016).
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bailout was accompanied by appointment of a financial-oversight board that
eliminated much of the Commonwealth’s financial autonomy.121 The new act
is unlikely to provide a permanent solution to the Commonwealth’s woes,
and any further assistance will likely come with still further restrictive strings
attached.
Nor is Puerto Rico necessarily unique; Illinois, for example, may not be
far behind, and plenty of American states find themselves in precarious
financial condition.122 Some scholars and policymakers have already begun
thinking about what happens when a State of the Union finds itself in Puerto
Rico’s predicament.123 The tradition of American fiscal federalism says that
the national government must let the states default, resisting any temptation
to bail them out. Recent government bailouts during the financial crisis,
however, provide one reason to doubt this commitment. If major investment
banks and automakers are “too big to fail,” then it is hard to see how the same
could not be true of California or Illinois.124 More fundamentally, the euroarea bailouts suggest that the institutional dynamics of modern federal
systems may make no-bailout commitments increasingly difficult to keep.
Most discussion of the euro-area bailouts has focused on the need to keep
Member States like Greece from exiting the common currency and to contain
systemic risks, such as a wave of bank failures in other parts of Europe. But
one should also ask what would have happened to Union law in the wake of
a general collapse or weakening of Greek public institutions. As already
discussed, virtually all of EU law is implemented and enforced by the
Member States. Given its dependence on the Member States to enforce
European law, Brussels has to care about the health and solvency of those
governments. They’re too helpful to fail.
If I am right about Europe on this point, then we should also worry about
the no-bailout commitment in the United States. After all, the federal
government in this country depends on the states to enforce much of federal
121. See Gillian B. White, Puerto Rico’s Problems Go Way Beyond Its Debt, ATLANTIC (July
1,
2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/puerto-rico-promesadebt/489797/.
122. See Egan, supra note 13 (discussing Illinois); Eileen Norcross & Olivia Gonzalez,
Ranking the States by Fiscal Condition 2017 Edition, MERCATUS CTR. (July 11, 2017),
https://www.mercatus.org/statefiscalrankings. It is worth noting that the States are not necessarily
more profligate than the national government; rather, they simply are more likely to actually have
to pay up in a pinch.
123. See generally WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 13; Johnson & Young, supra note
117.
124. See Rodden, Market Discipline, supra note 96, at 135; Svea Herbst-Bayliss & Jonathan
Stempel, Buffett: US Can Bail Out States, Insurers Pained, REUTERS (May 1, 2010, 1:59 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/berkshire-buffett-goldman-idUSN0225004920100502.
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law as well. Although the anti-commandeering doctrine precludes Congress
from forcing the States to implement federal law, most federal regulatory and
benefit schemes nowadays are cooperative federalism regimes where state
officials play a critical role.125 State and federal regulation and benefit
programs are now intertwined—and interdependent—in a way that they
simply were not during earlier state default episodes. One thus wonders
whether, in the contemporary era, Washington could really tell Illinois or
California to “drop dead” if either state were about to default on its debt.126
Several commentators have suggested that the American no-bailout
pledge is already fading. Jonathan Rodden, for example, has noted that
federal stimulus funding and Medicaid supplements amounted to “implicit
bailouts” during the most recent recession.127 Perhaps the erosion of the nobailout commitment is not overly threatening, given that other institutional
mechanisms—such as the balanced budget requirement in nearly every state
constitution—restrain state fiscal policy. On the other hand, financial markets
still appear to take the no-bailout commitment more seriously than may be
warranted; once it is perceived to have eroded, then one can expect the
financial costs of profligate state borrowing to decline as state credit ratings
come to be a function of national credit rather than actual state behavior. In
other words, the current state of affairs may not be stable and the future is
uncertain.
The EU experience can provide few guideposts indicating where
American fiscal federalism should go from here. The point, however, is
simply that in Europe the financial issues driving constitutional structure have
been more publicly salient than they have been in this country since the
Founding era. American federalism scholars and policymakers should not
wait for a true fiscal federalism crisis to pay more attention to money.

125. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668–72 (2001).
126. See Johnson & Young, supra note 117, at 147–48 (questioning the strength of the nobailout commitment). President Gerald Ford was famously reported to have told New York City
to “drop dead” in 1975 in response to requests for federal aid. See Frank Van Riper, Ford to City:
Drop Dead in 1975, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/president-ford-announces-won-bailout-nyc-1975-article-1.2405985 (originally published
on Oct. 30, 1975). It turns out that President Ford never actually said “drop dead,” and in fact he
signed legislation approving federal loans to the city two months later. See Sam Roberts, Infamous
‘Drop Dead’ Was Never Said by Ford, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/28/nyregion/28veto.html. The moral is not simply to take
things one reads in the paper with a grain of salt, but that “no bailout” commitments are difficult
to maintain no matter how emphatically expressed.
127. Rodden, Market Discipline, supra note 96, at 135.
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B. Migration, Immigration, and Terrorism
As if the euro were not enough, 2015 saw the EU reeling under two
additional and related crises. An “unprecedented” number of refugees from
Syria, Libya, Iraq, sub-Saharan Africa, and other places flooded into Europe
in 2015, “more than in any previous European refugee crisis since World War
II.”128 Through the first nine months of the year, over 800,000 people claimed
asylum in the EU.129 The influx impacted some Member States considerably
more than others, and individual states varied widely in their willingness to
accept the migrants.130 Immigration was already a sensitive issue in Europe,
with right-leaning anti-immigration policies making remarkable gains in
recent years. It is thus unsurprising that the refugee crisis has produced vocal
disagreements both within and among the EU’s Member States, or that the
EU’s central institutions have commenced legal action to enforce various
Member States’ obligations in relation to the influx.131
Responding to the migrant crisis became considerably more difficult in
November, when Islamic terrorists killed 130 people in Paris. 132
Unsurprisingly, the attacks seemed to spur opposition across Europe to
accepting more migrants, especially in light of concerns that some potential
terrorists may be among the many thousands of Middle Eastern refugees. 133
128. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., IS THIS HUMANITARIAN MIGRATION CRISIS
DIFFERENT? 1 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf.
129. Migrant Crisis: Greece, Croatia and Italy Face EU Legal Action, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35064599.
130. See, e.g., Europe’s Migrant Acceptance Rates, ECONOMIST (Sept. 1, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/09/daily-chart (showing that rates range
from over 300 migrants per 100,000 population in Sweden to a fraction of that in Hungary, Spain,
and Poland); Hungary Closes Border to Refugees as Turkey Questions EU Deal to Stem Crisis,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/17/hungary-closesborder-to-refugees-as-turkey-questions-eu-deal-to-stem-crisis (recounting Hungary’s efforts to
block refugees).
131. See Peter Teffer, French PM: Europe Can Receive No More Refugees, EUOBSERVER
(Nov. 25, 2015), https://euobserver.com/migration/131262 (reporting tensions among Member
States on refugees); Marcus Walker & Anton Troianovski, Behind Angela Merkel’s Open Door
for Migrants, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-angela-merkelsopen-door-for-migrants-1449712113; Bridge of Sneers, ECONOMIST (Dec. 5, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21679476-strange-spectacle-sweden-and-denmarksniping-each-others-immigration-policies-bridge (describing conflict between Denmark and
Sweden over refugee policy); Migrant Crisis: Greece, Croatia and Italy Face EU Legal Action,
supra note 129.
132. See Adam Nossiter & Rick Gladstone, Paris Attacks Kill More than 100, Police Say;
Border
Controls
Tightened,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
13,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/world/europe/paris-shooting-attacks.html?mcubz=0.
133. See, e.g., Holly Ellyatt, After Paris, Is There a EU Backlash Against Migrants?, CNBC
(Nov. 27, 2015, 3:28 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/27/paris-attacks-turn-eu-leaders-

1134

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

Moreover, the terrorist threat has brought pressure to revisit the Schengen
Agreement, which abolished border controls among twenty-six European
countries.134 Reinstituting permanent border controls, of course, would be a
highly-visible marker making Europe more like an intergovernmental
federation and less like a federal state.
Although the United States has not experienced a recent influx of migrants
comparable to that in Europe, immigration has become particularly salient
politically and legally in recent years. Although political debate has focused
on national policy, that debate has spilled over into the courts as a question
of federalism. That is because, as in Europe, opinion on immigration policy
tends to be unevenly distributed geographically, and particular states have
taken the lead in proposing a more rigorous enforcement policy. That, in turn,
has brought those states into political and legal conflict with the national
government. In particular, Arizona has sought to pursue a more rigorous
enforcement strategy than that preferred by the Obama administration, and
Texas has challenged the administration’s efforts to relax immigration
restrictions by executive action.135 Although the latter dispute centers upon a
question of national separation of powers, it became a federalism issue as
well when the administration challenged Texas’s standing, as a state
government, to participate in litigation over the legality of federal policy. The
Supreme Court upheld Arizona’s effort to crack down on employers of
undocumented aliens but largely struck down its efforts to ramp up criminal
enforcement against the undocumented aliens themselves.136 In the Texas
litigation, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s
decision enjoining the administration’s policy.137
Again, it is too early to tell how the EU’s migration policy, such as it is,
will play out. But two aspects of the European experience are worth
against-migrants.html; Anton Troianovski & Marcus Walker, Paris Terror Attacks Transform
Debate over Europe’s Migration Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2015, 12:06 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/paris-terror-attacks-transform-debate-over-europes-migrationcrisis-1447608944.
134. See After Paris, Drawbridges Up?, ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21678832-schengen-system-open-borders-wasalready-under-pressure-latest-terrorist-attacks-may (noting that “[c]alls to curb borderless travel
were already growing louder” prior to the Paris attacks, and that a number of countries had already
implemented limited border controls in response to the migrant crisis and prior terrorist incidents).
135. Texas has been complaining about the inadequacy of federal policy to secure the border
since it entered the Union in the 1840s. See T.R. FEHRENBACH, LONE STAR: A HISTORY OF TEXAS
AND THE TEXANS 275 (2d ed. 2000).
136. Compare Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011) (upholding the Legal
Arizona Workers Act of 2007), with Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012) (striking
down most provisions of a state law authorizing state and local law enforcement to enforce federal
immigration restrictions more aggressively than federal authorities).
137. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), aff’g 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
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considering in relation to American debates about immigration. First,
migration policy is asymmetrical in Europe; many Member States have
signed onto the Schengen Agreement, which abolished border controls
among signatory nations, but several others have not. The EU has thus
functioned as a federal system for some time without a uniform policy on
migration. This reality undermines the assumption, pervasive in critiques of
state governments’ efforts to pursue policies that impact immigration, that
such policies must necessarily be uniform throughout the United States.
A second, more technical point is that in Europe Member States are
generally accepted as appropriate litigants to challenge the lawfulness of EU
policy. The Fiscal Compact among euro zone countries, moreover, even
confers rights on signatory states to challenge the budgets of other states in
court if they violate the compact. The linchpin of the Obama administration’s
position in the Texas immigration litigation (as well as in the healthcare
litigation before that) has been that American state governments lack standing
to participate in such litigation. The argument has been that inter-institutional
litigation of this kind involves essentially political disputes that belong in the
political process rather than in courts.138 European inter-institutional litigation
demonstrates that this need not be the case, and that courts can often
effectively resolve legal disputes among the constituent units of a federal
system.
The most striking aspect of the EU’s migration and terrorism crises, of
course, has been these crises’ effect in fueling the rise of populist euroskepticism and undermining trust in EU institutions. I turn to that dynamic in
the next section.
C. Crises of Legitimacy and Trust
The Treaty of Rome—and most subsequent EU treaties—commit the
signatories to an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.”139 From
the general statements of EU politicians to the interpretive baselines set by
the European Court of Justice, the teleology of inexorable integration has
been a prominent feature of EU discourse for decades. Yet that feeling of
inevitability seems a distant memory in the wake of the United Kingdom’s
138. Although, as the Arizona litigation demonstrates, the United States does not hesitate to
sue state governments when it thinks they have violated federal law.
139. On the provenance and significance of the phrase, see Never Closer Union: Does the
European
Treaty
Commitment
Matter?,
ECONOMIST
(Oct.
24,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21676749-does-european-treaty-commitment-matterwhy-david-cameron-wants-exemption-ever-closer.
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vote to leave the Union on June 23, 2016. The Brexit vote reflects—and is
likely to stimulate—euro-skeptic tendencies across the EU.140 Public opinion
polling on trust in the EU had already hit an all-time low in 2013.141 Even
before the Brexit vote, “[a]n economic crisis, record unemployment and five
euro zone bailouts have taken their toll on the standing of the European Union
that . . . is increasingly viewed as an overbearing, cumbersome
bureaucracy.”142
Part of the problem is that, for decades, the EU has gotten by largely on
“output legitimacy”—that is, its remarkable record of delivering peace and
economic prosperity has caused many to overlook fundamental concerns
about the “democratic deficit” of its governing institutions.143 The euro crisis
(and the serious austerity measures imposed in some countries to remedy it)
called the Union’s ability to ensure prosperity into serious question, and the
migration and terrorism crises made the EU institutions seem ineffectual in
the face of external threats. With confidence in its outputs in tatters, the EU
found itself with little democratic legitimacy to fall back on.
We might compare this crisis of public confidence to recent developments
in the United States. Here, too, survey after survey confirms that trust in
public institutions is in decline. It is relatively commonplace to liken the rise
of populist euro-skepticism in Europe to the anti-government anger that
fueled Donald Trump’s candidacy in this country.144 Most of these analyses
focus on nationalism, xenophobia, anti-elitism, and the like. It is less common
to think of these developments in more institutional and structural terms.
To begin, it may help to view the decline in trust in American government
through the lens of input and output legitimacy. Academic lawyers have
labored for decades to come up with an input-based theory of legitimacy for
the administrative state, stressing the participatory procedures of the agency
process, for example, or the links between agency decision making and the
140. See, e.g., Anne-Sylvanine Chassany, Stefan Wagstyl, Duncan Robinson & Richard
Milne, How Will Brexit Result Affect France, Germany and the Rest of Europe?, FIN. TIMES (June
23, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/2b75023a-371d-11e6-9a05-82a9b15a8ee7.
141. See Record 60% of Europeans ‘Tend Not to Trust’ EU, EURACTIV (July 25, 2013),
https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/record-60-of-europeans-tend-not-to-trust-eu/
(reporting figures from a Eurobarometer poll).
142. Id.
143. See Craig, supra note 27, at 24.
144. See, e.g., J.A., Donald Trump Finds Hope in British Euroscepticism, ECONOMIST:
DEMOCRACY
AM.
(Aug.
18,
2016),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2016/08/mr-brexit; Eduardo Porter, In
‘Brexit’ and Trump, a Populist Farewell to Laissez-Faire Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES (June 28,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/business/economy/the-anger-wave-that-may-justwipe-out-laissez-faire-economics.html.
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democratically-accountable Congress and/or President.145 But however much
these accounts impress other academics, one suspects that the real staying
power of the American national administrative state is the sense that we
cannot do without it. Its public legitimacy rests not on its attenuated ties to
democratic theory, but rather—much as in the EU—on a democraticallychallenged institution’s ability to deliver prosperity and security. And also as
in Europe, those Americans who feel the administrative state no longer
delivers those public goods are much more likely to question its legitimacy
as a matter of democratic principle.
The much-neglected point, however, is that in both Europe and the United
States the decline of trust in government has a critical federalism dimension.
One can debate the relative weights of xenophobia and good old-fashioned
nationalism in motivating the Brexit vote and populist euro-skepticism in
other European countries.146 What is clear is that Brexit was a vote to shift
power to a smaller geographical unit that its proponents viewed as closer to
the people. It was, in other words, a choice to put trust in Westminster rather
than Brussels.147
Similarly, in this country, the precipitous decline in trust for national
public institutions contrasts with increasing public trust in state and local
government. One summary of the public opinion research concludes that
[c]itizens on average evaluate the performance of the federal
government as significantly lower than that of the state and local
governments, report less faith in the federal government to ‘do the
right thing,’ have significantly lower confidence in the ability of the
federal government to solve problems effectively, see the federal
government as significantly less responsive than lower levels of

145. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
146. Compare, e.g., Rich Lowry, A Vote for Self-Government, NAT’L REV. (June 28, 2016),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/437222/brexit-about-sovereignty-not-xenophobia, with
Andrew Solomon, A Perilous Nationalism at Brexit, NEW YORKER (June 28, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/a-perilous-nationalism-at-brexit. One suspects
that this is not simply an empirical question but also a question of the proper definitions of terms.
It is not uncommon, from some viewpoints, to see nationalism (and federalism) as inherently
xenophobic and/or racist.
147. And, interestingly, the vote seems to have renewed the movement to further devolve
power from Westminster to Edinburgh. See, e.g., No Agreement in Latest Scots-UK Brexit Powers
Talk, BBC NEWS: SCOT. POL. (Aug. 9, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotlandpolitics-40868557.
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government, and nearly 60 percent see the federal government as
the most corrupt level of government.148

Americans have lost faith in the federal government much more than they
have lost faith in government generally.
It is not hard to see why this should be so. In the early twentieth century—
especially during the New Deal—the national government enjoyed a massive
trust advantage over the states. That was reflected in significant institutionbuilding at the national level and the increasing primacy of national politics.
The public entrusted national authorities with expanded power because it
perceived the states as institutionally incompetent to deal with economic
dislocation, environmental degradation, and other critical problems. And for
the most part, in this period, the national government did not disappoint. But
national politics in the first part of the twenty-first century presents an
unedifying spectacle of partisan gridlock, bureaucratic incompetence,
financial irresponsibility, and lackluster results in addressing national
problems.
Meanwhile, state governments have largely avoided similar degrees of
partisan paralysis while considerably upgrading their institutional capacity.
Although the number of states with divided government fluctuates, it has
generally declined in recent years; as of October 2016, thirty states enjoyed
unified partisan control of both houses of the legislature and the
governorship.149 And the literature on state governance tends to conclude that
“states have vastly improved their capacity for dealing with problems” by
building the institutional capacity of legislatures, executive branches, and
state bureaucracies.150
My point is not that Brexit should reopen the nineteenth century debate on
American secession. It is, rather, that the EU probably undermined the
legitimacy of its federal union by seeking more uniformity than its publics
148. Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens Care About Federalism? An
Experimental Test, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 589, 598 (2007) (reporting results from the 2000
Attitudes Toward Government Study, but concluding that “[t]hese findings are consistent with
those reported by other scholars, using other nationally representative surveys”); see also State
Governments Viewed Favorably as Federal Rating Hits New Low, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 15, 2013),
http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/15/state-govermnents-viewed-favorably-as-federal-ratinghits-new-low/.
149. See Gubernatorial and Legislative Party Control of State Government, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Gubernatorial_and_legislative_party_control_of_state_government (last
visited Sept. 16, 2017); see also Karl Kurtz, A Significant Decline in Divided Government,
THICKET (Nov. 7, 2012), http://ncsl.typepad.com/the_thicket/2012/11/a-significant-decline-individed-government.html.
150. Virginia Gray, The Socioeconomic and Political Context of States, in POLITICS IN THE
AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 28 (Virginia Gray & Russell L. Hanson eds.,
8th ed. 2004).
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were ultimately willing to support. We run the same danger in this country.
Our national politics is so nasty in part because the stakes are so high; control
of the national government, even by the narrowest of margins, allows one or
the other faction to impose its worldview on huge swaths of the country that
fundamentally disagree. It is not hard to imagine, however, a de-escalation
by returning some of these divisive issues to jurisdictions where they can be
resolved to the satisfaction of a higher proportion of a smaller electorate, with
exit rights preserved for those who cannot live with the result.
It may, in other words, be time to reassess the allocation of responsibility
between the national government and the states—much as state governmental
failure caused us to reassess an earlier allocation in the twentieth century.
However it ultimately plays out, Europe’s crisis of governance demonstrates
that there is nothing inevitable about “ever closer union”; no iron law of
history requires consolidating more and more power in centralized
institutions. Indeed, one fairly likely scenario is that the EU will survive and
prosper by trying to do somewhat less. That would be a valuable lesson for
American federalism.
CONCLUSION
One should not take all this talk of crises too much to heart. I tell my
students each year that if one wants to know whether the EU is a success one
need ask only one question: “Has Germany invaded France?” More
generally, the map of the present-day EU reflects the healing of Europe’s
twentieth century division; Europe’s economy, democracy, and civil liberties
continue to remain—as they have for much of the past half-century—the
envy of much of the world. Although historian Brendan Simmons is right to
say that we have entered “a period of exceptional European uncertainty,” 151
suggestions that the EU’s “failure” is imminent are surely premature.
Both the EU’s successes and its dilemmas can help us think about
American federalism. I have tried to suggest here that the primary value of
looking to Europe is to help us question our domestic assumptions. European
federalism demonstrates that—contrary to much of the American literature—
the scope of regulatory jurisdiction may not be the best measure of a federal
balance. The euro crisis highlights the importance of fiscal federalism, and
the European debate about migration questions the inevitability of centralized
control. Finally, the EU’s recent setbacks remind us that centralization is not
inexorable, and that central power should take care in overreaching the
151. BRENDAN SIMMS, EUROPE: THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY FROM 1453 TO THE PRESENT
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bounds of national consensus. In all these areas, the point is not to copy or
avoid particular actions or arrangements pursued by the other governmental
system. Comparative law works best, rather, when it simply helps us figure
out what questions to ask.

